



Exceptions and Exclusions: The Right to Informed
Consent for Medical Treatment of People with
Psychosocial Disabilities in Europe
Citation for published version (APA):
Waddington, L., & McSherry, B. (2016). Exceptions and Exclusions: The Right to Informed Consent for
Medical Treatment of People with Psychosocial Disabilities in Europe. European Journal of Health Law,
23(3), 279 – 304. https://doi.org/10.1163/15718093-12341389





Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license:
Taverne
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.




Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 03 Nov. 2021
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi �0.��63/�57�8093-��34�389




Exceptions and Exclusions: The Right to Informed 
Consent for Medical Treatment of People with 
Psychosocial Disabilities in Europe
Lisa Waddington
Professor of European Disability Law, Maastricht University, Maastricht,  
The Netherlands
Bernadette McSherry
Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Melbourne Law School; Faculty of Law, 
Monash University; Australia; Foundation Director, Melbourne Social Equity 
Institute, University of Melbourne, Australia
Abstract
This article examines the relevant international law relating to informed consent to 
treatment for individuals with psychosocial disabilities and reflects on the protection 
offered in this respect by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. The article argues 
that while the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is beginning 
to influence case law of the European Court of Human Rights, only ‘weak’ protection 
has been afforded to people with psychosocial disabilities by the ECHR and the Court 
in relation to informed consent for medical treatment.
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1 Introduction
For those with psychosocial disabilities, the United Nations’ Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) has been hailed as signalling a 
‘new era’ in terms of limitations on, if not the abolition of, compulsory deten-
tion and treatment.1 In Europe, the CRPD is already being considered by the 
European Court of Human Rights (the Court or ECtHRs) which interprets and 
applies the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the CRPD has 
been referred to in a number of judgments. This is in spite of the fact that 
the Council of Europe, unlike the European Union, has not formally become a 
party to the CRPD.
Whilst the ECHR does not explicitly address informed consent for medical 
treatment, the Court has applied various provisions of the ECHR in the con-
text of involuntary medical treatment. The Court has considered, in particular, 
Article 3, which provides that no one shall be subject to ‘inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment’, and Article 8, which protects the right, inter alia, to private life 
in this context. As a result, individuals in Europe benefit from protection under 
a human rights convention which requires, in principle, informed consent for 
any medical treatment. 
This article begins by outlining the relevant international law relating to 
informed consent to treatment, with particular attention paid to the debates 
about the CRPD’s interpretation in relation to individuals with psychoso-
cial disabilities. The article then turns to examining the protection provided 
under the ECHR and the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, before reaching the conclusion that only ‘weak’ protection has 
been afforded to people with psychosocial disabilities in relation to informed 
consent to medical treatment.
1 T. Minkowitz, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
and the Right to be Free from Nonconsensual Psychiatric Interventions’, Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce 34(2) (2007) 404-428, 427. See also United Nations News 
Centre, 2006, ‘Lauding Disability Convention as ‘Dawn of a New Era’, UN Urges Speedy 
Ratification’, 13 December. www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20975#.VY-Of_mqqko, 
retrieved 28 June 2015. For an overview of the debate concerning abolition of laws enabling 
compulsory mental health treatment versus reform, see P. Gooding, ‘Supported Decision-
Making: A Rights Based Disability Concept and Its Implications for Mental Health 
Law’, Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 20(3) (2013) 431-451; B. McSherry, ‘Mental Health Laws: 
Where to from Here?’, Monash University Law Review 40(1) (2014) 175-197; B. McSherry and 
K. Wilson, ‘The concept of capacity in Australian mental health law: Going in the wrong 
direction?’, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 40 (2015) 60-69.
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2 Relevant International Law
The right to health has been recognised and developed within various human 
rights treaties and includes the right to access different elements of health-
care and related services. In this respect Jennifer Sellin has stated: ‘the interna-
tional right to health does not entail a right for individuals to be healthy, but it 
encompasses a number of freedoms and entitlements to enable individuals to 
attain the highest standard of health possible’.2 
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights sets out the general right to health.3 However, various human rights 
conventions, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
contain health-related rights, and seek to tailor these to the particular needs of 
the covered groups. In the disability context, the CRPD seeks to do the same. 
The CRPD addresses health in Article 25 which provides: ‘States Parties recog-
nize that persons with disabilities have the right to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health without discrimination on the basis of disability’. 
Para. (d) of the Article further specifies that State Parties shall: ‘[r]equire health 
professionals to provide care of the same quality to persons with disabilities as 
to others, including on the basis of free and informed consent . . .’. 
Articles 12 and 25 are supplemented by Article 15, which provides that ‘[n]o 
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment’ and Article 17, which provides that ‘[e]very person with dis-
abilities has a right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity on an 
equal basis with others’.4 An individual’s integrity is violated when he or she is 
subject to enforced treatment.5
2    J. Sellin, Access to Medicine, The Interface between Patents and Human Rights. Does One Size Fit 
All? (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2014) p. 82.
3    See also Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 5, Persons 
with disabilities (11th sess, 1994), UN Doc E/1995/22 p. 19 (1995), reprinted in Compilation of 
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 
UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 p. 24 (2003); and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, General Comment 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of health (22nd sess, 
2000), UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/
Rev.6 p. 85 (2003).
4    For a discussion of Article 17 CRPD, its drafting history, and its failure to explicitly prohibit 
forced medical treatment, see ibid., 769-770.
5    For a discussion of the relevance of Articles 15, 17 and 25 CRPD to involuntary treatment, 
see European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Involuntary placement and involuntary 
Downloaded from Brill.com09/14/2021 08:11:23AM
via University Library Maastricht
282 Waddington and McSherry
european Journal of health law 23 (2016) 279-304
Anna Bruce notes that the issue of whether health interventions could 
ever be performed without the recipient’s consent was one of the most con-
troversial issues during the negotiations of the Convention.6 Some guidance 
on this issue has now been provided by General Comment No 1 of the CRPD 
Committee on Article 12 which deals with Equal Recognition before the Law.7 
While the General Comment focuses on Article 12, it also addresses the issue 
of informed consent under Article 25. It states:
The right to enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health (art. 
25) includes the right to health care on the basis of free and informed 
consent. States parties have an obligation to require all health and medi-
cal professionals (including psychiatric professionals) to obtain the free 
and informed consent of persons with disabilities prior to any treatment. 
In conjunction with the right to legal capacity on an equal basis with 
others, States parties have an obligation not to permit substitute deci-
sion-makers to provide consent on behalf of persons with disabilities. 
All health and medical personnel should ensure appropriate consulta-
tion that directly engages the person with disabilities. They should also 
ensure, to the best of their ability, that assistants or support persons do 
not substitute or have undue influence over the decisions of persons with 
disabilities.8
General Comment No 1 certainly appears to suggest that all people, irrespec-
tive of their ability or disability, must give individual consent for medical 
 treatment and, whilst supported decision-making is permissible for those 
people who need it, substituted decision-making will always be regarded as 
incompatible with the Convention. This is reflected in Peter Bartlett’s observa-
tion that ‘the CRPD appears to proceed on the basis that disability cannot be 
used as a factor in determining whether compulsion may be imposed’.9 
Article 12(2) of the CRPD recognises that ‘persons with disabilities enjoy 
legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life’ and Article 
treatment of persons with mental health problems (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2012) pp. 22-23.
6    A. Bruce, Which Entitlements and for Whom? The Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and its Ideological Antecedents (Lund: Lund University Publications, 2014) p. 160.
7    Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1, Article 12: Equal 
recognition before the law (11th sess, 2014), UN Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1 (2014).
8    Ibid., para. 41.
9    P. Bartlett, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Person with Disabilities and 
Mental Health Law’, Modern Law Review 75(5) (2012) 752-778, 753.
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12(3) refers to exercising legal capacity. In the past, legal capacity has generally 
been conflated with mental capacity which the UN CRPD Committee defines 
as ‘the decision-making skills of a person’.10 The Committee states:
the concepts of mental and legal capacity have been conflated so that 
where an individual is thought to have impaired decision-making skills, 
often because of a cognitive or psychosocial disability, her legal capacity 
to make a particular decision is removed . . . an individual’s disability and 
or decision-making skills are accepted as a legitimate basis for denying 
her legal capacity and lowering her status before the law. Article 12 does 
not permit this discriminatory denial of legal capacity. . . .11
Laws that enable involuntary treatment on the basis of a loss of decision- making 
capacity on this view are therefore discriminatory. Mental capacity should no 
longer be intrinsically linked to legal capacity. In Genevra Richardson’s words: 
‘in its purest form there is no point beyond which legal capacity is lost. There 
is no binary divide’.12 On this basis, some authors have argued that there can 
be no exceptions to legal capacity and thus no justifications for substituted 
decision-making regimes.13 In comparison, others have argued that some form 
of substituted decision-making based on assessments of the ability to make 
decisions is necessary and permissible under Article 12.14 Rosemary Kayess and 
Phillip French, for example, state that the failure to acknowledge real differ-
ences in abilities in the CRPD leads to superficial equality and they argue this 
is most evident in Article 12,15 ‘which border[s] on a complete denial of the 
instrumental limitations associated with cognitive impairments’.16 
10    Ibid., para. 12.
11    Ibid., para. 13.
12    G. Richardson, ‘Mental Capacity in the Shadow of Suicide: What Can the Law Do?’, 
International Journal of Law in Context 9(1) (2013) 87-105, 92.
13    See, for example, T. Minkowitz, ‘Abolishing Mental Health Laws to Comply with the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, in B. McSherry and P. Weller (eds.), 
Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Laws (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) pp. 151-177.
14    See, for example, S. Callaghan and C. Ryan, ‘Is There a Future for Involuntary Treatment 
in Rights-based Mental Health Law?’, Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 21(5) (2014) 747-766; 
J. Dawson, ‘A realistic approach to assessing mental health laws’ compliance with the 
UNCRPD’, Journal of Law and Psychiatry 40 (2015) 70-79.
15    As well as Article 17.
16    R. Kayess and P. French, ‘Out of darkness into light? Introducing the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, Human Rights Law Review 8(1) (2008) 1-34, 7 (fn. 31).
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Joseph Dute, in a recent editorial in the European Journal of Health Law,17 
expands on this criticism in the context of General Comment No 1 and sub-
stitute decision-making in the context of medical treatment. He notes the 
interpretation of the CRPD Committee that substituted decision making is not 
compatible with the Convention, but criticises this as ‘a step too far’,18 argu-
ing that [t]he Committee ‘has lost sight of reality’.19 He argues that to abolish 
substituted decision-making in its entirety in the context of medical treatment 
would be ‘unworkable’20 and the Committee has failed to recognise that some 
individuals are simply unable to take a decision regarding their own medical 
treatment, even with extensive support. He also argues that such an approach 
would undermine the possibility to ‘protect people who are in need of care’21 
and substituted decision-making can facilitate suitable medical treatment 
and care. 
However, Dute does recognise that forced admission and treatment to a psy-
chiatric institution, which is the subject of much of the case law considered in 
this paper, whilst allowing for therapeutic interventions, does run the risk of 
being discriminatory as it is based the subjective concept of ‘dangerousness’.22 
In relation to those with psychosocial disabilities, Melvyn Colin Freeman 
and seven colleagues recently published a ‘personal view’ of the General 
Comment in the Lancet Psychiatry.23 They argue that the General Comment 
‘threatens to undermine critical rights for persons with mental disabilities, 
including the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health, access 
to justice, the right to liberty, and the right to life’.24 In addition, they state that 
‘[s]tigma and discrimination might also increase’.25 
17    J. Dute, Editorial ‘Should Substituted Decision-making Be Abolished?’, European Journal 
of Heath Law 22 (2015) 315-320.
18    Ibid., 318.
19    Ibid.
20    Ibid.
21    Ibid.
22    Ibid., 319. Dute does not refer to the ‘subjectiveness’ of the concept of dangerous — this 
attribution has been assigned to the concept by the present authors.
23    M.C. Freeman, K. Kolappa, J.M. Caldas de Almeida, A. Kleinman, N. Makhashvili, 
S. Phakathi, B. Saraceno, and G. Thornicroft, ‘Personal View ‘Reversing hard won victories 
in the name of human rights: a critique of the General Comment on Article 12 of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, Lancet Psychiatry 2(9) (2015) 
844-850.
24    Ibid., 844.
25    Ibid.
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Whilst recognising that legal capacity should always be assumed and safe-
guards should be provided, they argue, like Dute, that informed consent for 
medical treatment is not always possible and to deny individuals medical 
treatment on the basis that they are unable to consent would violate a number 
of other human rights protected in the Convention. Freeman and colleagues 
put the problems with the General Comment down to the ‘absence of clinical 
experts on the Committee’,26 the failure to consult clinicians when drafting the 
Comment, and the failure of the Committee to take note of users of psychiatric 
healthcare who support substitute decision-making in the context of medi-
cal treatment in some circumstances. Unlike Dute, Freeman and colleagues 
acknowledge the wide involvement of service users (including persons with 
psychosocial disabilities) in drafting the CRPD and the General Comment, and 
the support many users expressed for the abolition of involuntary treatment 
and detention, but argue that service users and others expressing a contrary 
view were not adequately heard.
Other scholars have been less critical of the CRPD and General Comment 
No 1, and, in some cases, spoken out in praise of them. Jill Stavert, writing in 
the Scottish context, argues that the General Comment and Article 12 of the 
CRPD can provide the stimulus to review existing legal capacity regimes and 
provisions concerning consent for medical treatment by persons with psy-
chosocial disabilities, with a view to providing greater protection of human 
rights and respect for individual wishes.27 Lucy Series similarly praises the 
CRPD for creating ‘an opening for discussions’ and ‘new tools for approaching 
these discussions through its powerful focus on equality, autonomy and the 
external determinants of disablement, vulnerability and risk’.28 She argues that 
the most important contribution of the CRPD is to require that persons with 
disabilities are actively involved in deliberations on laws and policies which 
concern them, rather than having their decisions ‘being delegated to the very 
“experts” they so often empower’.29 
Eilionoir Flynn and Anna Arstein-Kerslake, writing about the broader issue 
of legal recognition of ‘personhood’ and Article 12 of the CRPD, argue that 
26    Ibid., 848.
27    J. Stavert, ‘The Exercise of Legal Capacity, Supported Decision-Making and Scotland’s 
Mental Health and Incapacity Legislation: Working with CRPD Challenges’, Laws 4 (2015), 
296-313.
28    L. Series, ‘Relationships, autonomy and legal capacity: Mental capacity an support para-
digms’, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 40 (2015), 80-91, 89.
29    Ibid.
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personhood should be separated from cognition.30 They argue that Article 12 
establishes that legal capacity is universal, and always remains with the indi-
vidual. This imposes an obligation on States Parties to eliminate substituted 
decision-making making regimes in their entirety, recognise the diversity of 
ability to make decisions, and provide a continuum of support to ensure legal 
capacity. 
These various contributions reflect the ongoing nature of the debate 
amongst scholars in the field on the need for informed consent and the role 
(if any) for substitute decision-making.31 Suffice to say that the purist interpre-
tation of the CRPD poses a significant challenge to those State Parties which 
have ratified the Convention including States in Europe, where substituted 
decision-making by guardians or other legally appointed or recognised repre-
sentatives with regard to medical treatment is still common place. 
3 The European Convention on Human Rights and Involuntary 
Medical Treatment
Whilst the ECHR32 does not address the issue of consent to medical treatment 
specifically, the European Court of Human Rights has relied on Article 3 of the 
30    E. Flynn and A. Arstein-Kerslake, ‘Legislating personhood: Realising the right to support 
in exercising legal capacity’, International Journal of Law in Context 10(1) (2014), 81-104. 
See also E. Flynn and A. Arstein-Kerslake, ‘The Support Model of Legal Capacity: Fact, 
Fiction, or Fantasy?’, Berkeley Journal of International Law 32(1) (2014), 124-143, in which 
the authors set out their views on a ‘plausible’ legal framework for a regime of substituted 
decision-making which could replace existing regimes of substituted decision-making.
31    See special edition of the International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 40 (2015).
32    In addition to the ECHR, there are a number of non-binding, or soft law, instruments 
addressing this field which have been adopted by the Council of Europe. These include 
Council of Europe Recommendation No. REC (2004) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States Concerning the Protection of the Human Rights and Dignity of Persons with 
Mental Disorder (22 September 2004) and Council of Europe Recommendation Rec. No. 
R (99) of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Principles Concerning the Legal 
Protection of Incapable Adults (23 February 1999). Arnete Erdmane has argued that the 
‘hard law’ norms of the Council of Europe, including in particular the case law of the 
ECtHRs, does not always live up to the standards set out in these soft law instruments. 
A. Erdmane, ‘Liberty behind closed doors . . .? Involuntary placement and medical treat-
ment in psychiatric institutions from the human rights perspective’, Vienna Online Journal 
of International Constitutional Law 4(1) (2010) 90-146, 145. Lastly, the work of the European 
Committee on the Prevention of Torture has also addressed enforced treatment in psy-
chiatric institutions. For reasons of space, that work is not considered here. For a brief 
Downloaded from Brill.com09/14/2021 08:11:23AM
via University Library Maastricht
 287Exceptions and Exclusions
european Journal of health law 23 (2016) 279-304
ECHR, which prohibits ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’ and Article 8 of the 
ECHR, which protects the right to private and family life, to rule in a number 
of cases concerning informed consent. Moreover, the ECtHRs has frequently 
noted that the ECHR must be interpreted in light of ‘present-day conditions’.33 
In the case of Demir and Baykara the Court observed that ‘it has always referred 
to the “living” nature of the Convention, which must be interpreted in light 
of present-day conditions, and that it has taken account of evolving norms of 
national and international law in its interpretation of Convention provisions’.34 
It was sufficient for the Court that ‘the relevant international instruments 
denote a continuous evolution in the norms and principles applied in inter-
national law . . . and show, in a precise area, that there is common ground in 
modern societies’.35 The Court’s interpretation of ECHR provisions is therefore 
influenced by emerging international consensuses expressed through inter 
alia treaty law and it is clear that the wide-ranging, and widely ratified, CRPD is 
potentially relevant to many ECHR rights. This is already reflected in the many 
judgments in which the ECtHRs has referred to the CRPD.36
3.1 Article 3 — Prohibition of Inhuman and Degrading Treatment
The ECtHRs has recognised that, in some circumstances, the imposition of 
medical treatment without the consent of a patient can amount to a breach 
of Article 3. Elizabeth Wicks has argued that ‘[t]he key to prohibited treatment 
under Article 3 . . . appears to be the concept of human dignity rather than 
individual self-determination or autonomy’.37 
An important case addressing the involuntary treatment of a person with 
a psychosocial disability, which has been repeatedly cited by the Court, is 
Herczegfalvy v. Austria.38 The applicant in this case had served a number of 
discussion on this issue see European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Involuntary 
placement and involuntary treatment of persons with mental health problems, supra note 5.
33    See e.g. Marckx v. Belgium (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 
6833/74, 13 June 1979) and Demir and Baykara v. Turkey (European Court of Human Rights, 
Grand Chamber, Application No 34503/97, 12 November 2008).
34    Ibid., para. 68.
35    Ibid., para. 86.
36    See, for example, Glor v. Switzerland (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, 
Application No 13444/04, 30 April 2009) and, more recently, M.S. v. Croatia (No. 2) 
(European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 75450/12, 19 February 2015.
37    E. Wicks, ‘The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment under the European Convention on 
Human Rights’, Medical Law Review 9(1) (2001) 17-40, 22.
38    Herczegfalvy v. Austria (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 
10533/83, 24 September 1992).
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prison sentences following convictions for violent offences. In May 1977 a court 
ordered that the applicant should remain in detention after he had finished 
serving his sentence. This was done under the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure and on the basis that there was a risk that the applicant might 
abscond and commit further offences. In November 1977 the applicant was 
declared partly incapacitated by a court on the basis of a psychiatrist’s report 
and he was later placed in an institution for mentally ill offenders. In protest at 
his ongoing detention, the applicant began a hunger strike and became ill. He 
was then force fed, physically restrained by belts and straps, and given medica-
tion against his will. This went on for some time. The applicant argued before 
the ECtHRs that this treatment breached Article 3.39 In response the Court 
stressed that individuals detained in psychiatric hospitals are protected by 
Article 3 ECHR, and particular vigilance is required in protecting the rights of 
such individuals. The Court held:
The Court considers that the position of inferiority and powerlessness 
which is typical of patients confined in psychiatric hospitals calls for 
increased vigilance in reviewing whether the Convention has been com-
plied with. While it is for the medical authorities to decide, on the basis 
of the recognised rules of medical science, on the therapeutic methods to 
be used, if necessary by force, to preserve the physical and mental health 
of patients who are entirely incapable of deciding for themselves and for 
whom they are therefore responsible, such patients nevertheless remain 
under the protection of Article 3 (art. 3) (sic), whose requirements permit 
of no derogation.40
The Court continued to hold ‘as a general rule, a measure which is a thera-
peutic necessity cannot be regarded as inhuman or degrading. The Court 
must nevertheless satisfy itself that the medical necessity has been convinc-
ingly shown to exist’.41 In making this assessment the ‘established principles of 
medicine’ are to be regarded as ‘decisive’,42 although the Court did not elabo-
rate on how to identify such ‘established principles’. Applying this rule to the 
case at hand, the Court found the available evidence was ‘not sufficient to dis-
prove the Government’s argument that, according to the psychiatric principles 
39    He also asserted that it breached Article 8 ECHR. As with the Article 3 ECHR claim, the 
European Court of Human Rights found no violation of Article 8.
40    Supra note 38, para. 82.
41    Ibid.
42    Ibid.
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generally accepted at the time, medical necessity justified the treatment in 
issue’.43 As a consequence, no violation of Article 3 ECHR was found.44
This case has set the tone for subsequent Article 3 ECHR cases concerning 
involuntary treatment of people with psychosocial disabilities, and the case 
is also frequently cited by the Court in Article 8 ECHR cases. Whilst the Court 
continues to hold that such individuals fall within the protection of Article 3,45 
it also indicates that it will defer to the medical authorities to decide on the 
appropriate form of treatment, which can be administered by force if neces-
sary, ‘to preserve the physical and mental health of patients who are entirely 
incapable of deciding for themselves’.46
Two requirements were set out for forced treatment to be compatible with 
Article 3 ECHR in Herczegfalvy. First, the treatment must be to preserve the 
physical and mental health of the patient. It seems the Court will be rather def-
erential to the medical authorities with regard to this assessment. Admittedly 
the ECtHRs stated in Herczegfalvy that it had to be satisfied that the treatment 
was medically necessary, but, in the case at hand, it found there was insuf-
ficient evidence to prove that this was not the case — thereby implying that 
the burden of proof shifts to the applicant (patient) to show that the treatment 
given was excessive or unnecessary, rather than requiring the government to 
establish its necessity. Arguably the Court is far less deferential to medical 
practitioners regarding assessments of the necessity of medical treatment in 
the case of individuals who are regarded as competent, and has been more 
willing to regard such treatment as a breach of Article 3.47
43    Ibid., para. 83.
44    For criticism of the judgment in Herczegfalvy see Erdmane, supra note 32, 138-139.
45    For example, in Keenan v. United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, 
Application No 27229/95, 3 April 2001) para. 113, the Court held: ‘. . . in respect of a person 
deprived of his liberty, recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly neces-
sary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement 
of the right set forth in Article 3. Similarly, treatment of a mentally ill person may be 
incompatible with the standards imposed by Article 3 in the protection of fundamental 
human dignity, even though that person may not be able, or capable of, pointing to any 
specific ill-effects’. References omitted. In this case the Court found a breach inter alia of 
Article 3 after a prisoner with a psychosocial disability took his own life. The breach was 
not related to forced medication.
46    Herczegfalvy v. Austria, supra note 38, para. 82.
47    A significant case in this respect is Jalloh v. Germany (European Court of Human Rights, 
Grand Chamber, Application No 54810/00, 11 July 2006) in which the Court held that the 
forced administration of treatment which led to an individual regurgitating drugs which 
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Secondly, the patient must be ‘entirely incapable’ of deciding whether 
to accept the treatment or not. In Herczegfalvy the Court did not examine 
whether the applicant was indeed ‘entirely incapable’ of making such deci-
sions with regard to the alleged violation of Article 3, but, under another 
heading, found that the authorities have ‘a certain discretion’ when deciding 
whether a person is to be detained as ‘of unsound mind’48 under Article 5(1)49 
and held that the Austrian courts had not breached the ECHR when ordering 
the applicant’s detention. Moreover, when considering the alleged breach of 
Article 8, the Court did note that it attached: ‘decisive weight here to the lack of 
specific information capable of disproving the Government’s opinion that the 
hospital authorities were entitled to regard the applicant’s psychiatric illness 
as rendering him entirely incapable of taking decisions for himself ’.50 Once 
again, it seems that the burden of proof was shifted to the applicant to estab-
lish that he had the capacity to consent or refuse treatment.
Two subsequent cases in which the Court (or the related former European 
Commission of Human Rights) repeated its statement in Herczegfalvy that 
‘a measure which is a therapeutic necessity cannot be regarded as inhuman or 
degrading’ are Buckley v. United Kingdom51 and Wilkinson v. United Kingdom.52 
Like Herczegfalvy, both cases concerned individuals detained in secure psy-
chiatric hospitals following a criminal conviction. In Buckley the applicant’s 
son was restrained and injected against his will. Shortly thereafter he collapsed 
and died. The Commission found there was no indication that the treatment 
provided was ‘other than part of a therapeutic regime’ and noted that the 
applicant’s own medical expert had not criticised the hospital for negligent 
treatment. The Commission therefore regarded the treatment as ‘therapeutic’ 
and, even though it had been administered forcibly and may have contributed 
to the patient’s death, it did not amount to ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’.53
In Wilkinson the applicant was diagnosed with a psychotic mental illness 
and administered anti-psychotic medication against his will. The doctors 
treating Wilkinson regarded him as unable to consent given his paranoia and 
he has swallowed, done with the purpose of obtaining evidence, amounted to a breach of 
Article 3.
48    Ibid., para. 63.
49    Which provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of the person’. 
50    Ibid., para. 86.
51    Buckley v. United Kingdom (European Commission of Human Rights, First Chamber, 
Application No 28323/95, 26 February 1997).
52    Wilkinson v. United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application 
No 14659/02, 28 February 2006).
53    Ibid. The Commission also found no violation of Article 8 ECHR.
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argued that the medication would benefit him. In response the applicant 
argued that such treatment breached Articles 3 and 8 ECHR and that the treat-
ment was not necessary — thereby addressing one of the requirements raised 
by the ECtHRs in Herczegfalvy. In response the Court held:
The Court recalls that ‘medical necessity’, in this context, is not limited to 
life-saving treatment. It can also cover treatment, such as anti-psychotic 
medication, imposed as part of a therapeutic regime. In addition, the 
decision as to what therapeutic methods are necessary is principally one 
for the national medical authorities: those authorities have a certain mar-
gin of appreciation in this respect since it is in the first place for them to 
evaluate the evidence in a particular case. The Court’s task is to review 
under the Convention the decisions of those authorities.54
In response to the applicant’s evidence that at least one doctor had had doubts 
as to the appropriateness of the treatment, the Court held:
The Court considers that in many areas of medicine, not least psychia-
try, decisions as to treatment are complex matters of judgment. Medical 
experts can legitimately disagree and such disagreement is not, in itself, 
demonstrative of an absence of medical necessity for the relevant 
treatment.55
The Court concluded ‘the evidence is not sufficient to show that the national 
authorities exceeded their margin of appreciation in diagnosing that there was 
a medical necessity for the treatment’.56 
In Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine57 the Court applied the ‘Herczegfalvy test’ to 
a prisoner who seemingly did not lack capacity. The applicant was force fed 
whilst he was on a hunger strike and alleged this breached Article 3. The Court 
reiterated that ‘a measure which is of therapeutic necessity from the point of 
view of established principles of medicine cannot in principle be regarded 
as inhuman and degrading. The same can be said about force-feeding that is 
aimed at saving the life of a particular detainee who consciously refused to 
54    Wilkinson v. United Kingdom, supra note 52, 20. References to case law omitted.
55    Ibid., 21.
56    Ibid.
57    Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 
54825/00, 5 April 2005).
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take food’.58 However, it did not stress that this rule only applied to individuals 
deemed unable to consent — it seemed sufficient that a detainee’s life was 
at risk as a result of his hunger strike, even if the detainee had the capacity 
to agree or refuse to take nourishment or treatment. In this case the Court 
found that the ‘necessity’ of the force feeding had not been established, as the 
Government was unable to produce evidence showing medical justification 
for the action, and the applicant claimed that medical examinations had not 
been carried out prior to taking the decision to administer force feeding. As 
a result, the treatment administered was of such a ‘severe character’ that it 
amounted to torture.59
A more recent case in which the Court found a breach of Article 3 ECHR, 
and in which it referred to the CRPD and, notably Concluding observations of 
the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, is M.S. v. Croatia 
(No .2).60 In this case the applicant complained that, inter alia, her rights under 
Article 3 ECHR had been breached when she had been involuntarily detained 
in a psychiatric hospital and subjected to physical restraint for 15 hours follow-
ing her admission. The Court did not cite Article 12 CRPD or General Comment 
No 1 as relevant international material, but rather regarded Articles 13 CRPD 
on access to justice and Article 14 CRPD on liberty of the person as relevant to 
the case at hand. However, these articles were not referred to in the substan-
tive part of the judgment addressing the Article 3 complaint. In that part of 
the judgment the Court referred to the approach established in Herczegfalvy, 
and found that the physical restraint experienced by the applicant was capable 
of amounting to torture or unhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
Turning to the issue of justification, the Court considered whether the treat-
ment was medically necessary. It recognised that such measures should be 
‘employed as a matter of last resort’61 and the use of such measures ‘must be 
commensurate with adequate safeguards from any abuse’.62 The Court noted 
that the applicant’s medical records did not indicate that she was at immedi-
ate or imminent risk of harming herself at others at the time of the  admission63 
and that there was no evidence that alternative means of addressing ‘her 
restlessness’ had been tried or that the use of physical restrain was used as 
58    Ibid., para. 94.
59    Ibid., para. 98.
60    Supra note 36.
61    Ibid., para. 104.
62    Ibid., para. 105.
63    Ibid., para. 106.
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a matter of last resort.64 The Court was also not satisfied that the applicant 
had been effectively and adequately monitored whilst under restraint.65 As a 
result the Court found that the Government had failed to show that the use 
of restrains was ‘necessary and proportionate’66 and that Article 3 ECHR had 
been breached. It is hoped that this case is an indicator that the Court is will-
ing to scrutinise more closely the medical necessity of involuntary psychiatric 
treatment in the future.
In conclusion, whilst the Court has recognised that involuntary medical 
treatment can amount to ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’, in general the 
case law demonstrates that individuals who are detained in secure psychiat-
ric institutions who have been deemed unable to consent to medical care, or 
who can be subject to treatment for a ‘mental disorder’ under the terms of 
their detention,67 face great challenges if they are to establish that involuntary 
treatment breaches Article 3 ECHR. Such treatment will not breach Article 3 
if it is found to be therapeutically necessary. This approach has been criticised 
since it does not take account of the fact that necessary treatment can be 
administered in a number of ways, some of which are more or less intrusive 
or  restrictive.68 Electro-convulsive therapy, for example, can be administered 
under anaesthetic and with muscle relaxants, making it less likely to cause 
physical injuries to the patient than when no sedation is used.69 If the ‘neces-
sity’ of the treatment is the only factor considered, then the Court will not 
examine whether the treatment was administered in a humane way or indeed, 
in accordance with the wishes of the patient, who may have been willing to 
consent to the treatment in one form, but not in another. 
The case law also indicates that the Court is generally deferential to deci-
sions of national authorities, taken in accordance with domestic law, that 
individuals can be subject to psychiatric treatment against their will, and 
is also highly deferential to the decisions of medical practitioners that such 
treatment has a therapeutic basis and is designed to benefit the patient. This 
has led Bartlett to comment that prohibitions based on ‘torture or inhuman 
64    Ibid., para. 108.
65    Ibid., para. 111.
66    Ibid., para. 110.
67    This was the case for both Mr. Buckley and Mr. Wilkinson under the Mental Health Act 
1983 (UK).
68    Erdmane argues that this principle is reflected in Council of Europe soft law instruments, 
but is not applied by the European Court of Human Rights. Erdmane, supra note 32, 
143-145.
69    Ibid., 140.
Downloaded from Brill.com09/14/2021 08:11:23AM
via University Library Maastricht
294 Waddington and McSherry
european Journal of health law 23 (2016) 279-304
or degrading treatment’ have, in the context of people with psychosocial dis-
abilities in Europe, ‘been interpreted with astonishing deference to the medi-
cal profession’,70 and that: 
[i]n human rights terms, this is at best a peculiar starting point. It sug-
gests that the factual basis of whether a basic human right has been vio-
lated will be determined by privileging the views of the alleged violator 
of the right. This cannot be a general principle of human rights law: we 
would not similarly defer to the views of alleged torturers in determining 
an article 3 violation.71 
Anete Erdmane similarly argues ‘[t]he Court is hesitant to scrutinise medical 
evidence in substance, and some authors deem that it would be unlikely that 
the Court would ever start to do so’.72 Erdmane also argues, based on analysis 
of case law, that the Court relies on medical reports, and ‘is only verifying some 
procedural aspects of examinations’.73 In brief, the Court in general is reluctant 
to hold that the medical treatment provided is inappropriate or unnecessary, 
and adopts a very low level of scrutiny. It is too early to say if the recent case 
of M.S. v. Croatia (No. 2) heralds an intention to scrutinise more closely the 
decision of medical practitioners, and if the CRPD is influencing the Court’s 
approach in this respect.
3.2  Article 8 — Right to Private Life
A second route for individuals to challenge involuntary medical treatment is 
under Article 8 ECHR. In considering cases under this article the Court has 
stressed that ‘even a minor interference with the physical integrity of an indi-
vidual must be regarded as an interference with the right to respect for pri-
vate life under Article 8 if it is carried out against the individual’s will’.74 Aart 
Hendriks argues that ‘States have a positive obligation to make certain that 
physicians discuss the possible effects of a treatment with patients, and this in 
such a way that the requirement of informed consent is complied with. In the 
Court’s opinion, failing to provide patients with adequate information harms 
70    Bartlett, supra note 9, 756.
71    P. Bartlett, ‘Capacity, Treatment and Human Rights’, Journal of Mental Health Law (2004) 
52-65, 57.
72    Erdmane, supra note 32, 110. Footnote omitted.
73    Ibid.
74    Storck v. Germany (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 61603/00, 
16 June 2005).
Downloaded from Brill.com09/14/2021 08:11:23AM
via University Library Maastricht
 295Exceptions and Exclusions
european Journal of health law 23 (2016) 279-304
the self-determination of the person concerned and could constitute a viola-
tion of Article 8 ECHR’.75 The Court has also recognised that individuals have 
the right to refuse treatment, even if this treatment is seemingly in their best 
interest and has held ‘the imposition of medical treatment without the con-
sent of a mentally competent adult patient would interfere with his or her right 
to physical integrity and impinge on the rights protected under Article 8 of the 
Convention’.76 
Whilst Article 8 ECHR can be understood as embracing a prohibition of 
involuntary medical treatment in general, the article does allow for public 
authorities to interfere with the rights protected under the article where that 
interference is in accordance with the law, necessary in a democratic society 
and serves a legitimate interest, including the protection of health and the 
rights and freedoms of others.77 Cases concerning forced medical treatment 
have therefore often turned on the issue of whether the treatment fell within 
the exceptions set out in Article 8(2) ECHR, and was therefore permitted, or 
whether the treatment did not fall within the Article 8(2) ECHR exceptions. 
Medical treatment which is provided against a patient’s will must be pro-
vided in accordance with domestic law. In X. v. Finland78 the Court stressed 
that this means that the treatment must not only have some basis in domestic 
law, but ‘also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should 
be accessible to the person concerned, who must moreover be able to foresee 
its consequences for him, and compatible with the rule of law’.79 The applicant 
in this case had been subject to forced detention and medication in a psychi-
atric hospital. The Court found that the measures had a basis in Finnish law, 
but that they nevertheless amounted to a breach of Article 8, because these 
actions were based on a law which lacked proper safeguards against arbitrari-
ness. The decision to detain the applicant, which was taken by a court, included 
an ‘automatic authorisation’ forcibly to administer medicine if the applicant 
refused treatment, and this decision was the sole responsibility of doctors ‘who 
75    A. Hendriks, ‘Council of Europe’, in B. Toebes, A Hendriks and J.R. Hermann (eds.), Health 
and Human Rights in Europe (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012), pp. 21-50, 37; referring to 
Testa v. Croatia (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 20877/04, 
12 July 2007) para. 52.
76    Ibid., p. 30; referring to Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia (European Court of Human 
Rights, Chamber, Application No 302/02, 10 June 2010) para. 135. Italics inserted.
77    Article 8(2) ECHR.
78    X. v. Finland (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 34806/04, 
3 July 2012). A violation of Article 5(1) (right to liberty and security) was also found in this 
case.
79    Ibid., para. 6.
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could take even quite radical measures regardless of the applicant’s wishes’.80 
Similarly, the Court found that the imposition of psychiatric treatment on an 
applicant for over five years amounted to a breach of Article 8 in Shopov v. 
Bulgaria.81 Whilst the treatment had a legal basis, the Court found that the 
regular judicial supervision which was required under the relevant legislation 
had not been provided, and this led to a violation of the Convention. The Court 
therefore views medical treatment imposed on patients without their consent 
as violating Article 8 ECHR where there is an absence of appropriate legal pro-
tection and supervision.
The second (cumulative) requirement for permissible forced medical treat-
ment is that the treatment must be necessary. This was at issue in the case of 
Glass v. United Kingdom,82 which involved a decision of medical authorities to 
provide treatment to a severely disabled child against the wishes of the mother, 
and without a court order. This case therefore did not concern a person with 
psychosocial disabilities, but a mother, who was regarded as competent, taking 
a decision on behalf of her child. The hospital believed the child was close to 
death and gave him powerful medicine which was designed to relieve his pain. 
The authorities had also placed a ‘do not resuscitate’ on the child’s file. All of 
this was done against the mother’s wishes. In spite of this treatment, the child 
recovered from this crisis and was allowed to return home. The Court found 
that the decision to impose treatment on the child (the second applicant in 
the case) in these circumstances had resulted in an interference with his right 
to respect for his private life and, in particular, his right to physical integrity. 
Whilst the Court found that this interference was in accordance with the law 
and pursued a legitimate aim, the Court did not regard the measure as neces-
sary, since the authorities could have referred the question to a domestic court 
for a decision on the need for the treatment they favoured. 
The third requirement, namely that the measure pursues a legitimate aim, 
was considered in Schneiter v. Switzerland,83 which concerned the use of 
forced medication in a psychiatric hospital. In this case the Court found that 
the applicant’s complaint under Article 8 was ill-founded because the treat-
ment had a legal basis and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights 
80    Ibid., para. 9.
81    Shopov v. Bulgaria, (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 17253/07, 
16 April 2013). A violation of Article 5(1) ECHR was also found in this case.
82    Glass v. United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 
61827/00, 9 March 2004).
83    Schneiter v. Switzerland (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 
63062/00, 31 March 2005).
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and freedoms of others. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered that 
the applicant had previously struck a nurse. This echoes the conclusions of 
Hendriks that ‘. . . the Court’s case law shows that forced treatment can also 
be justified without this being in the interests of (the health of) the person 
concerned’.84 
Whilst the general position is that forced medical treatment will amount 
to an unjustified interference in an individual’s private life under Article 8 
ECHR, this rule seems to not apply in the case of patients who are deemed 
to be ‘mentally incompetent’. If the domestic law provides for sufficient safe-
guards, including the review of treatment at appropriate intervals, and if the 
treatment is regarded as necessary and serving the legitimate aim of protecting 
the health of the patient or the rights and freedoms of others, such treatment 
can be imposed without consent. Indeed, the indications are that the Court 
has not always applied the ‘justification’ tests set out in Article 8(2) in such 
cases, regarding enforced treatment on ‘incompetent patients’ as compatible 
with the Convention as long as it is ‘therapeutically necessary’. In this respect 
Hendriks, quoting many of the cases discussed under the section on Article 
3 ECHR above, has noted ‘[t]he Court is inclined to regard the failure to com-
ply with the requirement of consent as justified when this involves “therapeu-
tic necessity” for treatment, a criterion which the Court interprets broadly.’85 
More recently other scholars have argued that the Court has developed its case 
law in this respect:
[a]lthough the Court formerly considered that treatment without con-
sent did not constitute an interference when the patient was not capable 
of giving consent, it now appears to accept that there will be an interfer-
ence in such cases and that lack of capacity to consent is a matter perti-
nent to justification under Article 8(2).86 
In general the assessment of capacity to consent is made by domestic courts 
on the advice of psychiatrists or other medical specialists. There is a risk 
that a perceived irrational or illogical refusal to give consent may in itself be 
taken as evidence of inability to give consent.87 The disadvantaged position of 
84    Hendriks, supra note 75, 39; referring to Jalloh v. Germany (European Court of Human 
Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 54810/00, 11 July 2006) para. 70.
85    Hendriks, ibid., 39. Case law citations omitted.
86    D. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. Bates and C. Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) p. 544. Footnote omitted.
87    A point also made by Erdmane, supra note 32, 128. 
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 marginalised groups, and their vulnerability to torture and ill treatment, has 
been recognised by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, who refers to ‘[s]truc-
tural inequalities, such as the power imbalance between doctors and patients, 
exacerbated by stigma and discrimination’.88 Such factors can also influence 
the identification of certain patients as unable to consent. In addition, courts 
may not feel equipped or inclined to question the assessment of members 
of the medical profession that an individual is unable to assess the benefits 
and risks of medical treatment, and consent to such treatment. However, as 
Wicks argues ‘[t]he freedom to make one’s own choices, which . . . is protected 
by Article 8, is only of value if the act of choosing is protected irrespective of 
the choice made’.89 If the protection from involuntary treatment offered by the 
ECHR is rendered inapplicable in the case of individuals deemed unable to 
consent, and the ECtHRs is quick to accept the assessment of the medical pro-
fession and domestic courts regarding inability to consent, such individuals 
can be left in a very vulnerable position.
In contrast, in other fields the ECtHRs has recently shown a willingness 
to question the assessment of States regarding the ability of individuals to 
make decisions affecting their own life, and the consequences of denial of 
legal capacity. A prominent example of such a case is Alajos Kiss v. Hungary,90 
which concerned the automatic disenfranchisement of the applicant, who had 
a psychosocial disability, following his consensual placement under partial 
guardianship. The Hungarian Government had argued that it was permissible 
for the legislature to establish rules ensuring that only those who are capable 
of assessing the consequences of their decisions and making conscious and 
judicious decisions should participate in public affairs, and that the disenfran-
chisement was compatible with the ECHR. Whilst the Court recognised that 
States would normally have a wide margin of appreciation in establishing who 
was entitled to vote,91 it held that an ‘indiscriminate removal of voting rights, 
without an individualised judicial evaluation and solely based on a mental dis-
ability necessitating partial guardianship, cannot be considered compatible 
88    J.E. Méndez, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment, HRC, 22nd sess, UN Doc A/HRC/22/53 (1 February 
2013), para. xxvi-xxiv; cited by J. Cohen and T. Ezer, ‘Human Rights in Patient Care: A 
Theoretical and Practical Framework’, Health and Human Rights 15(2) (2013), 7-19, 8 (foot-
note 4).
89    Wicks, supra note 37, 27.
90    Alajos Kiss v. Hungary (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 
38832/06, 20 May 2010).
91    Ibid., para. 41.
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with the legitimate grounds for restricting the right to vote’.92 The Court found 
that the impugned measure breached Article 3, Protocol 1 ECHR on the right 
to free elections.93 In reaching this decision the Court stated that it regarded 
persons with psychosocial disabilities (‘the mentally disabled’)94 as a ‘partic-
ularly vulnerable group’,95 and referred to the ‘considerable discrimination’96 
which they have suffered in the past. The Court noted the relevance of the 
CRPD, including Article 12 on legal capacity, in its judgment.97 However, it is 
worth noting that this case involved an ‘automatic disenfranchisement’ follow-
ing a guardianship order, with no assessment of individual capacity. The Court 
accepted that an individualised assessment could result in an individual los-
ing the right to vote.98 In cases concerning forced medical treatment there is, 
purportedly at least, such an individualised assessment, and this may partly 
explain the ECtHRs reluctance to question the legitimacy or procedures asso-
ciated with the decision regarding competency to consent. 
3.3 Legitimacy of Substitute Decision-making by Guardians / Legal 
Representatives
The law of most European states allows for a guardian or legal representative 
to consent to medical treatment on behalf of a person who is regarded as lack-
ing legal capacity.99 The ECtHRs has not held that medical treatment which 
has been approved by a guardian, but objected to by an individual who has 
formally been denied legal capacity, breaches the Convention.100 However, the 
92    Ibid., para. 44.
93    Article 3, Protocol 1 ECHR provides as follows: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to 
hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will 
ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.’
94    Supra note 90, para. 42.
95    Ibid.
96    Ibid.
97    Ibid., para. 14.
98    Ibid., para. 44.
99    See L. Waddington, Access to Healthcare by People with Disabilities in Europe — A 
Comparative Study of Legal Frameworks and Instruments, Synthesis Report for the 
Academic Network of European Disability Experts, (2014) 79-99 (Part 2, Section 2.1 — 
Informed Consent for Medical Treatment). Available via: www.disability-europe.net/
content/access-healthcare.
100    Although the Court was invited to consider whether such treatment, which was given in 
a psychiatric hospital to which the applicant had been admitted with the consent of his 
guardian, breached Article 8 ECHR in Sýkora v. Czech Republic (European Court of Human 
Rights, Chamber, Application No 23419/07, 22 November 2012). This part of the applica-
tion was however rejected on grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
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Court has ruled in a number of cases in which individuals without legal capac-
ity have been detained in psychiatric institutions, with the consent of their 
guardians, but in opposition to their wishes. Such cases have been based on 
Article 5(1) ECHR, which provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to liberty and 
security of the person’. 
In Shtukaturov v. Russia101 the Court examined the lawfulness of the deten-
tion in a psychiatric hospital of an adult who had been declared legally incom-
petent. Under Russian law the placement in the hospital was considered 
voluntary since the applicant’s guardian had consented. As a result there was 
no need for a court order and the procedural safeguards applicable to a non-
voluntary detention did not apply.102 Nevertheless the applicant had indicated 
his resistance to the order declaring him incompetent and to his detention 
on repeated occasions, and had contacted a lawyer. The ECtHRs acknowl-
edged that the applicant ‘lacked de jure legal capacity to decide for himself ’. 
However, it found that ‘this does not necessarily mean that the applicant was 
de facto unable to understand his situation’.103 In conclusion the Court found a 
breach of Article 5(1) noting that it was ‘unable to accept in the circumstances 
the Government’s view that the applicant agreed to his continued stay in the 
hospital’.104 Commenting on this case, Anete Erdmane has argued that the 
ECtHRs ‘placed actual capacity above legal capacity’105 and held that the appli-
cant had been deprived of his liberty in a coercive manner, due to the fact that 
he did not give consent to the placement. She notes that the agreement of the 
guardian was not sufficient to recognise the placement as voluntary. A similar 
conclusion was reached in Stanev v. Bulgaria106 in which the Court held that 
because the applicant’s institutionalisation was agreed to by his representa-
tive, but without the authorisation of the applicant, Bulgaria had violated the 
applicant’s right to personal liberty under Article 5(1).107 
It is possible to envisage a similar challenge to medical treatment which 
has been consented to by a guardian or legal representative, but objected to 
by an applicant, who has been formally denied legal capacity. In many States 
101    Shtukaturov v. Russia (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application 
No 44009/05, 27 March 2008).
102    Ibid., para. 102.
103    Ibid., para. 108.
104    Ibid., para. 109.
105    Erdmane, supra note 32, 122.
106    Stanev v. Bulgaria (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application 
No 36760/06, 17 January 2012).
107    See also Stanov v. Bulgaria (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application 
No 25820/07, 17 March 2015) and Sýkora v. Czech Republic (European Court of Human 
Rights, Chamber, Application No 23419/07, 22 November 2012).
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the removal of legal capacity is complete, and does not take into account any 
(residual) ability an individual may have to decide on action or treatment in 
specific areas or to express preferences.108 However, such an ‘all or nothing’ 
approach often does not reflect the actual ability or capacity of individuals, 
and nor does it take into account that capacity may fluctuate over time. If the 
Court is not willing to scrutinise very closely such medical treatment, which 
may well be perceived as forced and non-consensual by patients, it risks leav-
ing disadvantaged and excluded individuals in a very vulnerable position. Its 
recent case law on institutionalisation will hopefully be followed with regard to 
such cases, should they come before the ECtHRs. In any case, the Court seems 
to have indicated its intention to scrutinise compliance with the ECHR with 
regard to people with psychosocial disabilities by stating: ‘any encroachment 
in the Convention rights of those belonging to particularly vulnerable groups 
such as psychiatric patients can be justified only by “very weighty reasons” (see 
Alajos Kiss), and the authorities should not lose sight of the importance of fully 
respecting the physical and personal integrity of such persons, in conformity 
with Article 8 of the Convention’.109
4 The Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights  
and Biomedicine
In addition to the ECHR and related case law, the Council of Europe Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine110 is relevant to the matter in hand. The 
European States which have ratified the Convention are to give effect to its 
provisions through domestic law,111 but, unlike the ECHR, the Convention is 
not backed up by a European court to which individuals can turn, and which 
108    For examples in this respect see Waddington, supra note 99, 80-93 (Part 2, Section 2.1.1 — 
The Law on Patient’s Consent refers to Disabled Persons, or People Unable to Consent, or 
People without Legal Capacity).
109    Plesó v. Hungary (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 41242/08, 
2 October 2012) para. 65.
110    Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine, Oviedo 4 April 1997. This Convention is also known as the Oviedo 
Convention. For a brief discussion on the relevance of the Oviedo Convention to invol-
untary treatment see European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, supra note 5, at 
25-26.
111    Article 1(2). See also E. Riedel, ‘Global Responsibilities and Bioethics: Reflections on the 
Council of Europe’s Bioethics Convention’, 5 Global Legal Studies Journal (1997), 179-190 at 
182.
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can identify breaches and require compliance. However, the ECtHRs can take 
the Convention into account in its judgments. The Convention addresses the 
need for informed consent for medical treatment. As a general rule, it provides 
that ‘[a]n intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the 
person concerned has given free and informed consent to it. This person shall 
beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature 
of the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks. The person con-
cerned may freely withdraw consent at any time’.112 Article 6 of the Convention 
addresses the protection of persons who are not able to consent. Subject to 
some exceptions related to scientific research and organ and tissue removal 
from live donors,113 medical treatment can only be carried out on a person who 
is unable to consent where the treatment is for his or her direct benefit.114 The 
Convention provides:
Where, according to the law, an adult does not have the capacity to 
consent to an intervention because of a mental disability, a disease or 
for similar reasons, the intervention may only be carried out with the 
authorisation of his or her representative or an authority or a person or 
body provided by law.
The individual concerned shall as far as possible take part in the 
authorisation procedure.115
This authorisation may be withdrawn at any time in the best interests of the 
person concerned.116
The Convention provides that, subject to appropriate protective provisions 
which have been prescribed by law, ‘a person who has a mental disorder of a 
serious nature may be subjected, without his or her consent, to an intervention 
aimed at treating his or her mental disorder’. However, this can only happen 
‘where, without such treatment, serious harm is likely to result to his or her 
health’.117
112    Article 5.
113    Article 20. In some circumstances an organ or tissue may be removed from a live donor 
who is unable to consent. A number of safeguards apply to individuals in this case, and 
this is only allowed if e.g. there is no compatible donor available who has the capacity to 
consent and the recipient is a brother or sister of the donor.
114    Article 6(1).
115    Article 6(3).
116    Article 6(5).
117    Article 7.
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In addition treatment can be carried out in ‘an emergency situation’ where 
consent cannot be obtained, and the intervention is necessary with a view to 
benefiting the health of the individual concerned.118 Lastly, the Convention 
provides that any previously expressed wish of a patient regarding treatment 
is to be taken into account in a situation in which the patient is not able to 
express his or her wishes at the time the treatment is to be provided.119 Eibe 
Riedel, writing in 1997, has argued that, with regard to consent, ‘the Convention 
glossed over the underlying controversies’.120 In brief, the Human Rights and 
Biomedicine Convention certainly allows for medical treatment without the 
consent of the patient in some situations, and as such is not compliant with 
the General Comment No 1 of the CRPD Committee on Article 12 which regards 
substitute decision-making, even when ostensibly done in the best interest of 
the patient, as a breach of the CRPD.
5 Conclusion
This article has explored how the European Convention on Human Rights, and 
related case law of the European Court of Human Rights apply to people with 
psychosocial disabilities and the right to informed consent for treatment and 
related detention. The case law indicates that while there has been some atten-
tion paid to human rights breaches in relation to processes surrounding deten-
tion, informed consent in itself has not been viewed as a pre-requisite for the 
treatment of people with psychosocial disabilities. 
Whilst the ECHR has been interpreted as requiring informed consent for 
medical treatment in general, the ECtHRs has been willing to make an excep-
tion to this requirement for people with psychosocial disabilities. The case law 
demonstrates that the Court is fairly deferential to the decisions of medical 
practitioners regarding both the need for the treatment and the ability of the 
patient to consent. This is also reflected in the decisions of national courts 
which have heard the relevant cases previously. In recent years the ECtHRs 
has indicated that it will scrutinise particularly closely ‘any encroachment on 
the rights of . . . psychiatric patients’,121 but this does not seem to have been 
reflected in its judgments on informed consent to date. Nor has the CRPD had 
a noticeable impact in this area of case law. Eilionoir Flynn and Anna Arstein-
Kerslake argue that, to date, the Court has only been ‘tinkering around the 
118    Article 8.
119    Article 9.
120    Riedel, supra note 111, 183.
121    See quotation cited above from Plesó v. Hungary, supra note 109.
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edges of violations related to legal capacity’,122 which includes the issue of 
consent to medical treatment. They argue that the Court could recognise the 
right to legal capacity on an equal basis as others by finding that a denial of 
legal capacity amounts to a violation of the prohibition against discrimination 
found in Article 14 ECHR.123 To date there is no evidence that the Court is mov-
ing towards such an approach, in spite of occasional references to the CRPD in 
its judgments. 
In brief, only ‘weak’ protection has been afforded to people with psychoso-
cial disabilities in relation to informed consent to medical treatment under the 
ECHR. This also seems to be the case under the Council of Europe Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine which explicitly allows for substitute 
 decision-making with regard to medical treatment in some cases.
In contrast stands the CRPD which, according to the CRPD Committee in its 
General Comment No 1 on Article 12, requires that medical treatment can only 
be given following the informed consent by persons with disabilities, includ-
ing people with psychosocial disabilities. However, the approach to date in 
Europe indicates that it may prove difficult for the purist interpretation of the 
CRPD to have much traction, and existing case law presents barriers to the full 
acceptance of the rights set out in the CRPD by courts in relation to those with 
psychosocial disabilities.124 
Whilst the CRPD may promise a ‘new era’, it may prove difficult to influence 
case law which is steeped in ‘reading down’ the rights of those with psychoso-
cial disabilities. Nevertheless, whilst the ECtHRs may find itself unable to inter-
pret the ECHR in the purist manner mandated by General Comment No 1, and 
this may also be the case for the practice of the Member States of the Council 
of Europe, it is submitted that the Court could still set higher levels of scrutiny 
and provide greater protection from unwanted medical treatment experienced 
by people with psychosocial disabilities in Europe.
122    Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake, supra note 30. 
123    Ibid., 139-142. The Court declined to consider an Article 14 ECHR claim in the case of M.S. 
v. Croatia (No. 2) supra note 36.
124    Stavert, supra note 27, also notes that the CRPD and ECHR ‘adopt somewhat different 
approaches to the recognition and exercise of legal capacity’ at 302.
Downloaded from Brill.com09/14/2021 08:11:23AM
via University Library Maastricht
